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Abstract  
This study investigates the speed and drivers of IPSAS adoption in Indonesia. Using data from 
205 local government entities, the results show while the interaction between auditors and 
representatives of opposition on the council has more impact on the speed of adoption than 
with the councillors representing the government, the timing of the council meeting has delayed 
the adoption of IPSAS accrual. Government grant, Supreme Audit Office, councillors and 
religious beliefs are the isomorphic drivers of IPSAS adoption. Our results support the 
hypotheses that the three institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) influence 
the speed of IPSAS adoption. 
Keywords: Indonesia; IPSAS adoption; speed of adoption; isomorphic pressures 
1. Introduction 
The International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) has developed 
international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS) in order to support the new public 
management reform (NPM) of many countries. The standards also enhance the comparability 
of, and transparency in, financial reporting in the public sector including central, local 
government or state-owned enterprises (Pina and Torres 2003; Roje et al. 2010; Sour 2012). 
As at 2017, 101 countries have adopted IPSAS (Deloitte, 2017). Using data from a sample of 
205 local government entities (171 municipalities, 34 cities), this study investigates the speed 





(DiMaggio and Powell,1983) and  three main sources of literature, namely: (i) the adoption of 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) (Judge et al. 2010), (ii) adoption of 
international standards on auditing (ISA) (Boolaky and Soobaroyen, 2017) and the adoption of 
international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS) (Sellami and Gafsi, 2017). All three 
studies fundamentally use institutional theory and data from the same sources. They infer that 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures drive the adoption of international standards. 
However, the features of the isomorphic pressures are somehow different when comparing 
these three studies. Other studies have used case studies of individual municipalities to explain 
the complexities of IPSAS (Robison and Harun 2005; McLeod and Harun 2014; Brusca et al. 
2013). For example, McLeod and Harun (2005) use the case of municipality of Tangerang, 
Palu, and District/cities of Bima in Indonesia to describe the difficulties with IPSAS adoption. 
Indonesia has a long history of local government including its accounting system dominated 
by the Dutch Accounting Plan (Boolaky et al., 2018). Extant studies on local government 
accounting have provided insights on performance, accountability and challenges facing local 
government in implementing the New Public Management reforms and mostly on developed 
countries (McLeaod and Arun, 2005; Carvalho et al. 2007; Christiaens et al. 2010; Christiaens 
et al., 2014).  
Our study is different from the above-mentioned studies in several ways. In the context 
of Indonesia, there is no study on the status and speed of IPSAS accrual adoption. First, we 
examine the IPSAS adoption procedures and in the context of local government in Indonesia. 
Second, we measure the speed of adoption of IPSAS accrual accounting (hereunder IPSAS 
adoption) and provide empirical evidence on its determinants. While many countries have 
adopted IPSASs in both central and local government, the adoption method and the speed of 
adoption vary among countries (Christiaens et al. 2010). Some countries use (1) the centralised 





pathway that is, IPSAS adopted at municipal level before central government level (Christiaens 
et al. 2010). As a result, the time taken to adopt IPSAS (speed of adoption) by local government 
entities varies both within and between countries. Moreover, the drivers of this variation are 
still unknown.   
Our study is motivated by this lack of evidence in developing countries like Indonesia. 
There are specific factors that drive developing countries to adopt international standards, e.g. 
religious beliefs, political tendency and regulations (Scott, 1987). There are some tensions 
among these institutional factors, hence worthy to investigate their impact on the speed of 
IPSAS adoption. Arguably, religion may slow the speed of adoption because of the dilemma 
between having a local standard based on the religious faith and a foreign standard like IPSAS. 
Prior research suggests that religiosity influences the individual’s perception of the 
acceptability of certain accounting choices (Longenecker et al. 2004).  We, therefore, 
investigate whether religious belief in Indonesia affects the speed of adoption of IPSAS. Nobes 
(1983) and Archambault and Archambault (2009) on  political factors’ impact on the 
accounting system of a country we investigate further in this matter by examining the   
influence of municipal and city councillors on the speed of   IPSAS adoption. We also capture 
in this study the pressure of the Supreme Audit Office’s reports and their interactions with 
councillors on speed to adopt IPSAS – a novelty in IPSAS research.  
The study is important in a number of ways. Firstly, it aims to increase our 
understanding of how institutional factors at regional level influence the speed of IPSAS 
adoption. While past studies (Judge et al, 2010; Boolaky and Soobaroyen, 2017; Sellami and 
Gafsi, 2017) have provided interesting insights on the drivers of adoption of international 
standards their conclusions were broad and do not necessarily apply to a specific country. They 
cannot generalise that the same types of isomorphic pressures apply to Indonesia. Moreover, 





international standards. Our study sheds light on this by arguing that developing countries in 
particular may have some specific factors that affect the speed of IPSAS adoption. Secondly, 
our study builds up a more structured database for future research by academics, professional 
bodies and standard setters such as IFAC and the Indonesian Government Accounting Standard 
Committee.  Findings from this study may assist professional accounting bodies, regulators, 
national audit offices, policy-makers including politicians as well as local and foreign aid 
agencies in making decisions. Regulators may use the findings to identify problems with 
adoption and the national audit office may use the findings as a reference for future audits. 
Politicians including policy-makers may utilise the findings to identify shortcomings in their 
policies related to accounting innovation in local government. The study also informs 
professional accounting bodies, local and international, on the extent to which professional 
accountants are abiding by international best practice. Foreign aid agencies such as the World 
Bank may be interested to know whether Indonesia has met its commitments to IPSAS 
adoption. Finally, findings from this study will   update the IFAC database on IPSAS status in 
Indonesian local governments. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is on theory and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes the research methods whereas section 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical results. The paper ends with a conclusion in section 5. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Institutional theory (IT) views organizations as operating within a social framework of 
norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or 
acceptable economic behaviour. This theory is important in explaining accounting choice in 
organizations where self-interest-maximizing actors cannot exert effective influence over the 





studies used IT to identify the link between an organization’s institutional environment and its 
choice of accounting (Carpenpter and Feroz 2001; Collier 2001; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; 
Tsamenyi et al. 2006; Turtle and Dillard 2007; Judge et al. 2010). Carpenter and Feroz, (2001) 
use institutional theory to explore how institutional pressures exerted on four state governments 
(New York, Michigan, Ohio, Delaware) influenced the decision of these governments to react 
towards the use of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for external financial 
reporting. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) examined how the articulation, enforcement and 
modification of an organization’s budgeting system reflect societal expectations. In a similar 
vein, Tsamenyi et al. (2006) used Dimaggio and Powell (1983) neo-institutional theory (NIT) 
to investigate changes in the accounting and financial information system of a large Spanish 
electricity company.  They found that an integrated accounting and financial information 
system was imposed by the head office on its subsidiaries to support organizational changes 
designed in response to regulatory requirements.  
Dimaggio and Powell (1983) identify institutional pressures as ‘isomorphic pressures’ 
and classify them into coercive, mimetic and normative. Past studies in accounting have used 
NIT to explain accounting choice in both public and private sectors (Collier, 2001; Brignall 
and Modell, 2000; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Judge et al. 
2010).  For example, Hussain and Hoque (2002) and Judge et al. (2010) have focused on, 
among other things, identifying and explaining the sources of isomorphic pressures on the 
adoption of accounting systems and accounting regime respectively, whereas the power and 
actions of individual organizational actors to respond to the institutional pressures were 
addressed in the studies of (Collier 2001; Modell, 2002). Boolaky and Soobaroyen (2017) use 
the same theory to investigate the institutional factors influencing the adoption of international 
standards on auditing while Sellami and Gafsi (2017) test the theory in the context of IPSAS 





factors on the time taken to adopt IPSAS contrary to extant studies that tested the extent of 
adoption. 
Hypotheses Development 
Coercive Isomorphism on IPSAS Adoption  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) identify three types of isomorphism within neo-
institutional theory. First is “coercive” isomorphism derived from resource dependence and 
legitimacy concern. It represents the pressure from highest level (Scott, 2001). As such, 
institutions can be one of the main drivers that can push on economic actors to conform to (i) 
international financial reporting standards (Alon and Dwyer, 2014), (ii) international standards 
on auditing and (iii) international public sector accounting standards. Central and local 
governments can be compelled to adopt international standards because of coercive pressures 
from outside the country such as foreign funding agencies. This is a reality in less developed 
countries such as Indonesia that is dependent significantly on foreign aid which, as a result, 
compels change(s) in recipient countries’ financial reporting landscape in order to increase 
transparency (Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Hassan, 2008). We, therefore, argue that international 
organisations (both governmental and non-governmental) can put a timeline on a country to 
adopt IPSAS. Research in private sector accounting provides evidence on the impact of 
coercive pressures on IFRS adoption (see Judge et al. 2010; Boolaky and Soobaroyen, 2017). 
For example, Touron (2005) advanced that coercive isomorphism was a strong driver of US 
GAAP adoption by French firms because of the US dominance over global economy. 
Arguably, the degree of foreign grant for public sector development by a country is associated 
with IPSAS adoption (Rodrigues and Craig, 2006). Similarly, pressures from auditors through 
their audit reports also push for adoption of international best practice. In the context of 
Indonesia, the central government through MOHA 64/2013 law sets the time line for 





effect before they can adopt1whereas the Supreme Audit Office can follow up and issue 
qualified reports on the entities that have not adopted2. Local aid from central government or 
foreign aid from outside the country also influence local government entities in their speed to 
adopt IPSAS. Based on the forgoing, we posit:  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the economic, political and regulatory pressures the quicker the 
adoption of IPSAS. 
 Mimetic Isomorphism and Adoption IPSAS 
Mimetic isomorphism befalls when social actors imitate the behaviour of others to 
increase their own legitimacy and acceptance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 69). Mimetic 
isomorphism is a principal factor leading to homogenisation (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). 
Competitors’ accounting standards influence a firm’s decision to adopt similar standards.  
Likewise, a country foreign business partners could influence its decision to adopt IPSAS (El-
Gazzar et al. 1999). Our argument is that Indonesia has imitated other countries by adopting 
IPSAS in order to demonstrate its legitimacy towards funding agencies. Likewise, the decision 
of a municipality or city to adopt IPSAS is influenced by other successful municipalities that 
have adopted IPSAS. Guler et al. (2002) found that the degree of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was positively associated with the adoption of international quality standards 
within a nation.  Drawing from Rodrigues and Craig (2006), firms of the same type (in terms 
of age, size) and in same industry often emulate the success of others. Georgescu and Ionescu 
(2014) suggested that once Romania adhered to the European Union public sector accounting 
framework, the public accounting system was transformed and adapted according to the 
requirements and practice imposed by IPSAS (see also Biondi 2014; Jones and Caruana 2015). 
Drawing from the above, the following hypothesis is, therefore proposed. 
 
1 According toMOHA64/2013 the Mayor is entrusted to pass a regulation to adopt IPSAS before the deadline 
set. 





Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between an entity’s size, age and the speed of 
adoption of IPSAS 
 Normative Isomorphism and Adoption of IPSAS 
             Normative isomorphism emanates from professionalization noting that coercive and 
mimetic pressures influence professions as well as organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
It refers to the shared values that consequently harmonise thought and deed within institutional 
environments (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991). We argue that educational system and religious 
practices are the two main institutions, by which collective value and conformity of thought 
and deed can be enacted.  Accounting scholars have contended that the educational level of a 
country can affect accounting development (see Gernon et al. 1987; Zhegal and Mhdehbi 
2006). For example, Zhegal and Mhdehbi, (2006) submit that educational level is an important 
pillar to support accounting development mainly modern accounting systems (see Sellami and 
Gafsi, 2017 for IPSAS adoption). In a similar vein, Gernon et al. (1987) posit that educational 
level is positively related to the competence of professional auditors. Arguably, the decision to 
adopt IPSAS depends on the level of competence, both academic and professional, to be able 
to understand and apply these standards, together with the ability to make professional 
judgements and process complex information (Zeghal and Mhedhbi 2006). The higher the level 
of education of a country the deeper and larger will be its trade, as a result, of adopting 
international standards (Dow and Karunaratna 2006; Hassan, 2008).  
              Indonesia is also a country with Islamic faith embedded in its socio-economic and 
educational systems.  Callen et al. (2011) and McGuire et al., (2012) suggest that religions 
impact on accounting choices and good accounting practice. In a similar vein, Conroy and 
Emerson (2004) contend that it is less likely for highly religious adherents to concur with the 
practice of accounting manipulation. Prior research also suggests that religiosity influences 





2004). Using the same rationale, Indonesians’ religious beliefs and practices could influence 
the decision to adopt IPSAS (see also Parboteeah et al., 2008). On the other hand, the literacy 
rate in Indonesia could be another factor affecting IPSAS adoption at municipality and city 
levels. With a low literacy rate, the public in general may give less interest to the standards of 
reporting that local government entities are using than focusing on the infrastructural 
development achieved in their localities. In order to determine the impact of education level on 
the speed of IPSAS adoption, we have used the number of university graduates working in both 
municipalities and cities. Our argument is that they are better equipped in terms of knowledge 
to understand the importance of adopting an innovative accounting system and standard. 
Drawing from the above, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of education and the more the religious faith, the quicker 
the adoption of IPSAS accrual  
4. Research Methodology:  
Data & Sample 
The ‘Peraturan Bupati regulation’ translated as Municipalities/Cities’ Mayor 
Regulations is main document to refer in this study.  We access this document through various 
reliable sources namely; (i) Municipalities’ Websites, (ii) National Gazettes, Local newspapers 
and Documentation and Information of Law, Web of each municipality/city (for example: 
jdih.jatimprov.go.id). We have then hand-collected data from Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, 
National Library, Supreme Audit Office reports, The World Bank Reports, PewResearch 
Centre reports on Indonesia and the annual reports of municipalities and cities. A random 
sample of two hundred and five (205) local government entities from twenty-five (25) 
provinces (171 municipalities and 34 cities) is drawn from a population of five-hundred and 





34 provinces. Though we could not access data for nine (9) provinces, our sample covers the 
seven main islands of Indonesia and is thus large enough to represent the local governments.  
Speed of Adoption (Adoption Velocity) 
Velocity or speed is the rate at which one achieves something. Metrication is a common 
technique used in physics to measure velocity in terms of seconds, minutes, hours and day 
(Karp and Flatt 1990; Tang et al. 2009). In the context of IPSAS adoption, it is the rate or 
relative speed at which a municipality/city adopts IPSAS. We used Tang et al.’s (2009) 
measurement model to measure adoption velocity, i.e. the length of time a municipality/city 
takes to adopt IPSAS. The adoption process contains a series of stages in Indonesia. The first 
stage is the issuance of MOHA decree 64/2013 (December 3 2013). The second stage is the 
municipality council’s first meeting scrutinising the requirements of the Decree. The third 
stage(s) is municipal meetings to initiate a regulation to adopt IPSAS. MOHA decree 64/2013 
set 31 May 2014 as a deadline for all municipalities and cities to adopt IPSAS accrual i.e.  181 
days (from 3 December 2013 to 31 May 2014) under MOHA decree 64/2013 to adopt IPSAS. 
We use two proxies to measure adoption speed. First, we measure the velocity using a metric 
on a scale of 0-10 points and, second the number of days a municipality or city takes to adopt 
IPSAS. In simple terms, the adoption velocity score is measured as follows: 
TT/LTTA * 10 : TT= Time taken to pass and issue regulation to adopt IPSAS by a 
municipality. LTTA = Latest time to pass and issue regulation to adopt IPSAS. 10 = the scale 
ranging from 0… 10.   
Empirical Model 
Given the feature of the dependent variable, we have used multiple regression analysis 
to determine the impact of institutional pressures on IPSAS adoption in Indonesia. We also use 





scale of 0-10 and (ii) the time taken in days to adopt IPSAS accrual. Similarly, we use 
alternative measurements for two other variables viz., size and politics. We run different 
regression models to report the robustness of our results that explain our hypotheses. A split 
regression is run (Diniz and Bronchi, 2005) whereby the main sample is segmented into two 
sub-samples: (i) IPSAS adoption speed by municipalities and (ii) by cities. We describe below 
our model specifications. 
SPAD(1) = β0 + β1 FORGRANT + β2 LOCGRANT + β3 REL+  β4 POLYS + β5  AUDOP+  β6 SIZE+ β7 SOF + 
β8 ∑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑺 + ε                                                      (1) 
SPAD(2) = β0 + β1 FORGRANT + β2 LOCGRANT + β3 REL+  β4 POLYS + β5  AUDOP+  β6 SIZE+ β7 SOF + 
β8 ∑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑺 + ε                                                      (2)                                       
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable: Speed of Adoption. 
We use different measures for adoption velocity namely; (i) speed – on a scale of 0-10 
and (ii) time taken – in number of days. Any municipality/city that scores in the lower quartile 
on the scale is an early adopter; and in the upper quartile of the scale as a late adopter; and in 
the median scale as (iii) a moderate adopter. Any entity that has not passed any regulation by 






Coercive isomorphism: We use three variables namely:  (POLYS) size of the council, grants 
(central government and foreign institutions) and auditor’s opinion on the financial report as 
coercive pressures on each municipality (Judge et al., 2010; Sellami and Gafsi, 2017). We then 
test the impact of each variable in different models. We predict that POLYS will be a coercive 
pressure to IPSAs adoption. The Supreme Audit Office has power under the law to report on 
shortcomings of compliance with relevant accounting framework and makes recommendations 
thereon. Local government entities are required to abide by the recommendations of the 
Supreme Audit Office. Grants are the amounts of foreign and local grant received by each 
entity and this is available from the financial reports. We draw audit opinions from the reports 
of the Supreme Audit Office for the year ended 2014. They are classified into unqualified, 
qualified, adverse and disclaimer of opinion measured as ‘4’, ‘3’, ‘2’, and ‘1’ respectively.  
Mimetic Isomorphism: Auditors play a key role in influencing both municipalities and 
cities to adopt IPSAS accrual accounting as opposed to REL. We have also taken necessary 
steps to obtain assurance that there is no multi-collinearity problems3 among the variables. 
The results are not reported for terseness.  Mimetic isomorphism is a key factor leading to 
homogenisation (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). The decision of a municipality/city to adopt 
IPSAS is therefore, linked to its fellow competitors. For instance, a province’s or an island’s 
decision in Indonesia to adopt IPSAS is likely to be influenced by its age, size, debt level and 
source of finance (Rodrigues and Craig, 2006; Sellami and Gafsi, 2017). Contrary to private 
sector accounting research, this study uses two different proxies for size of municipality: (1) 
size measured as the surface area in square miles covered under a municipality and (2) the 
 
3 The two main tests are Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Factor (TF). According to Field (2000)  a 
VIF  value below 10 confirms that multi-collinearity does not affect the findings in the regression and Tolerance 
Factor Value of greater than 0.10 provides further evidence that there is no such symptom (see also Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham 2006; Boolaky 2012). Condition Index and the variance decomposition 
matrix are also utilised. According to Field (2009) the threshold for condition index lies in the range of 15 to 30. 
He further argued that condition index with a value of 30 and variance proportion greater than 0.90 indicate 





total population in a municipal constituency. Debt level is the classical metric for gearing, i.e. 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Normative Isomorphism: Normative isomorphism(s) are collective values that entail 
conformity of thoughts and deeds within institutional environments (Di Maggio and Powell, 
1983). Educational system and religious beliefs and practices are the two main institutions that 
entice collective values and conformity of thoughts and deeds. Nobes (1998) suggests that the 
more literate the society is, the better the level of its professionalism, hence the adoption of 
IPSAS. The number of graduate workers in each municipality/city is used to measure level of 
education as a normative pressure and sourced from Central Statistical Bureau.  Religious 
belief and faith is a new institutional variable tested for the first time in the adoption process. 
It is the percentage of Indonesians of Islamic faith. We source this data from 
PewResearchCenter Report4 2013.  
Control Variables: Auditors play a key role in influencing both municipalities and 
cities to adopt IPSAS accrual accounting as opposed to REL. We have also taken necessary 
steps to obtain assurance that there is no multi-collinearity problems5 among the variables. 
The results are not reported for terseness.   
 
Based on previous research in private sector accounting, two variables are control 
variables relevant to municipality/city accounting. These variables are age, and debt level. 
Table 1 lists the variables and the expected relationship with the dependent variables. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE 
5 The two main tests are Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Factor (TF). According to Field (2000)  a VIF  value below 10 confirms that multi-collinearity does not affect the 
findings in the regression and Tolerance Factor Value of greater than 0.10 provides further evidence that there is no such symptom (see also Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham 
2006; Boolaky 2012). Condition Index and the variance decomposition matrix are also utilised. According to Field (2009) the threshold for condition index lies in the range of 15 to 30. He 





5.  Results 
Classification of IPSAS Accrual Adopters in Indonesia 
Table 2 groups the local government entities of twenty-five (25) provinces into four 
categories namely: early adopters, on-time adopters or mandatory adopters, late-adopters and 
non-adopters. There are only eighteen (18) early-adopters (8.78%) of IPSAS accrual and it 
comprises fifteen (15) municipalities (7.32%) and only three (3) cities (1.46%) out of the 
sample (205) studied. This finding suggests that the Mayors of these municipalities have been 
very proactive in their decision to adopt and implement IPSAS accrual.  In regards to on-time 
adopters, three (3) municipalities are under this category and none among the cities. However, 
sixty-eight (68) municipalities (33.17%) and thirteen (13) cities (6.34%) are late-adopters. This 
suggests that they have adopted IPSAS accrual after the deadline of 31 May 2015. In total, 
there are a hundred and three (103) non-adopters including 86 municipalities (41.95%) and 17 
cities (8.29%) of the whole sample of 205). The repercussions of late adoption is that these 
municipalities and cities will not be able to produce their IPSAS accrual financial statement for 
the year ended 31 December 2015. 
INERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 Speed of Adoption 
Table 3 reports the distribution in the time taken by municipalities and cities to adopt IPSAS 
accrual in Indonesia. 





 15 Municipalities and 3 cities have already adopted IPSAS accrual before 3 
December 2013. While MOHA 64/2013 provides a deadline equivalent to 181 days, only 49 
municipalities and 5 cities could meet the deadline.  31municipalities took between 120 to 180 
days and 15 between 240 to 300 days. Four even took more than year. As regards cities, 6 have 
taken between 6 to 8 months to adopt IPSAS accrual. The reason(s) for this sluggishness could 
be due to the difference in the timing of the meeting of the councils to pass the Mayor 
Regulation to that effect.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables for the full sample.  
Speed of Adoption: SPAD (1)’s  mean value is 3.41 and standard deviation 2.23. The 
75th percentile is 8.54; which again suggests that local government entities took a longer time 
to adopt IPSAS accrual. This reconciles with the large number of late adopters (68 
municipalities and 13 cities reported in Table 2). SPAD (2)’s mean value is 120.15 days and 
standard deviation 100.15 days. In both cases, the results suggests that there are more late 
adopters than on-time adopters and early-adopters.  
Grant: LGT, local grant measured in absolute dollars values has a mean of 2993.83 and 
standard deviation of 804.49. FGT, foreign grant measured as well in dollars has a mean value 
of 1092960.93 and standard deviation of 113649.76. Comparatively, local government entities 
in Indonesia obtain a large amount of their funding from foreign agencies who would usually 
require compliance with international standards. Yet, Indonesian local governments have taken 
a long time to adopt IPSAS. Education: EDU, measured the number of graduate workers in 
municipalities and cities. It indicates that on average the sample of local government entities 
employ 55921.92 graduates. Audit Opinions: AUDOP, audit opinions measured by four 





1.82 and 75th percentile of 2 points. This suggests that majority of the audit reports were critical 
in regards to compliance with standards. Size and Age: Size, measured by log of revenue has a 
mean value of 5.39 and standards deviation 1.80 and 75th percentile 6.17. Age, measured by 
number of years indicate that there are municipalities with an average life of around 174 years. 
There are also a small number of municipalities with a life longer than 300 years. The older 
local government entities may be less inclined to adopt international standards. Religion and 
Politics: REL, religions measured by the indexing number of mosque to total population, has 
an average value of 0.22 and standard deviation of 0.44 whereas POLYS measured by the 
number of councillors has a mean value of 11.12 and a standard deviation of 3.09. As far as 
REL is concerned the result suggests that religion may have a negative impact on the decision 
to adopt IPSAS accrual. Debt: Debt, measured as a percentage of the value of total liabilities 
less total grant on total assets has a mean value of 3.14 and standard deviation of 1.52.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 5 below reports the Pearson Correlation results. The results indicate that there is 
a positive correlation, though not significant between LGT and FGT and speed of IPSAS 
accrual accounting adoption.  EDU, SIZE are also positively correlated with the dependent 
variable. However, AGE is significantly but negatively correlated with the speed of adoption. 
This suggests that older municipalities and cities are less inclined to adopt IPSAS accrual 
accounting. Auditors play a key role in influencing both municipalities and cities to adopt 
IPSAS accrual accounting as opposed to REL. We have also taken necessary steps to obtain 
assurance that there is no multi-collinearity problems6 among the variables.  
 
6 The two main tests are Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Factor (TF). According to Field (2000)  a VIF  value below 10 confirms that multi-
collinearity does not affect the findings in the regression and Tolerance Factor Value of greater than 0.10 provides further evidence that there is no such 





INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Regression Analysis 
We report the results in Table 6. Model 1 & 2 are the results from the pooled regression using 
the two different proxies for speed of adoption. Models 3 &4 are for municipalities and Models 5 & 6 
for cities.  
Model Testing (Pooled Regression): Velocity of Adoption 
Model 1 (column 1 Table 6) provides empirical evidence for the first time on the speed of 
adoption of IPSAs accrual. The overall model fit is 32.7% measured by the adjusted R-squared. The 
findings provide support that all the isomorphic pressures have an impact on the speed of adoption of 
IPSAS accrual as posited in the hypotheses.  
Evaluating the Impact of Coercive Isomorphism 
 (FGT) Foreign grant is found to be a positively significant driver of the speed of adoption (beta 
coefficient = 0.289, t value = 3.179, p value = 0.002). This finding provides empirical support to the 
hypothesis that pressure(s) from funding agencies and in particular foreign agencies positively impact 
on the speed of adoption (Judge et al., 2010). (LGT) Local grant is negatively but not significantly 
associated with the speed of adoption (beta coefficient = -0.014, t value = 0.130, p value = 0.897). This 
suggests that the more the grant comes from local agencies, the less likely a municipality or city will be 
inclined to adopt IPSAS accrual accounting, hence delaying adoption. The reason could be that these 
grants are for some specific projects and the providers are more interested with the effective utilisation 
of the grant than IPSAs adoption. Contrastingly, foreign agencies such as World Bank would prefer a 
reporting system that is universally accepted. (AUDOP) Audit Opinions: Similar to the impact on extent 
of adoption, audit opinions of the Supreme Audit Office is also positively associated with speed of 
adoption and is significant at <5% level (beta coefficient = 0.213, t value = 2.007, p value = 0.049). 
 
According to Field (2009) the threshold for condition index lies in the range of 15 to 30. He further argued that condition index with a value of 30 and variance 





This result demonstrates the effectiveness of the audit report in luring local government entities to adopt 
IPSAS. It suggests that the impact of the audit report on the probability that a municipality or city would 
adopt IPAS accrual accounting quicker is at least 21 .3%. (POLYS) Politics is positive but not 
significantly related with the speed of adoption (beta coefficient = 0055, t value = 0.708, p value = 
0.480). This indicates that councillors including mayors of municipalities and cities are less willing to 
push for IPSAS adoption. This finding reconciles with the number of late adopters and non-adopters of 
IPSAS accrual among local government entities.  
Evaluating the Impact of Mimetic Isomorphism  
 (SIZE) is positively related to the speed of adoption (beta coefficient = 0.171, t value = 2.027, 
p value = 0.293). The larger the size of a local government entity the more likely it will adopt IPSAS 
accrual accounting more quickly. Large entities have better resources both in terms of technology and 
human resources as opposed to the medium and small ones (Rodrigues and Craig, 2006). In Models 
1- 6, we have used log of revenue to measure size. We also used alternative proxies for size 
such as square kilometres covered by a municipality or city and population size under each 
constituency and the results are nearly the same. 
Evaluating the Impact of Normative Isomorphism  
(REL) religion is negatively related to the adoption velocity (beta coefficient = -0.222, t value 
= -2.124, p value = 0.041). This result suggests that religion delays the speed of adoption. The more 
religious the environment in Indonesia the slower the adoption speed. Arguably, this could be due to 
alternative accounting system that the population may envisage because of the risk inherent to 
accrual manipulation. Religiosity influences individual perceptions of the acceptability of 
certain accounting choices (Longenecker et al. 2004) and in the context of Indonesia there 
could be a tendency towards an Islamic accounting framework.  (EDU) education is positive but 
moderately influences the velocity of adoption (beta coefficient = 0.178, t value = 2.267, p value 0.068). 





up IPSAS adoption to meet the deadline set by the central government. That would assist the 
government in realising its objective(s) as set down in MOHA 64/2013. The next section discusses the 
results from the split regression.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Split Regression 
The split regression provides insights on the difference in the impacts of the institutional 
pressures on the IPSAS adoption between municipalities and cities. We also report the results in Table 
6.  
Velocity of IPSAS Adoption: The Case of Municipalities 
Model 3 (Table 6): The overall model fit is 24.3% measured by the adjusted R Squared. This 
signifies that the institutional pressures explain nearly 24% of the variance in the speed of IPSAS 
adoption among municipalities. This Model also finds that the three types of institutional pressures as 
proposed by Di Maggio and Powel (1983, 1991) influence the time taken by local government entities 
in adopting IPSAS accrual accounting.  
Evaluating the Impact of Coercive Isomorphism  
  (FGT) Foreign grant is a highly significant driver of the velocity of IPSAS adoption among 
municipalities (beta coefficient = 0.318, t value = 4.007, p value =0.0013). Based on the beta 
coefficient, foreign grant is the strongest unique driver that positively influences the speed of IPSAS 
adoption when controlling the variance explained by the other variables. As submitted by (Neu and 
Ocampo 2007; Hassan, 2008) foreign aids are given to countries subject to the condition that 
they bring about changes in the financial system. (LGT) Local grant is negatively associated with 
the speed of adoption (beta coefficient = -0.021, t value = 0.190, p value 0.875). Similar to the finding 
on extent of adoption, this finding suggests that the more local grant that a municipality has the longer 
time it will take to adopt IPSAS accrual accounting. As mentioned before, this finding boils down to 





international standards’ adoption as would the case be for foreign grant. (AUDOP) audit opinions issued 
by the Supreme Audit Office in general is also found to be a significantly positive driver of the speed 
of adoption (beta coefficient = 0.199, t value = 2.029, p value 0.026). This finding signifies that the 
impact of the audit report explains only 20% in the speed of adoption. The implication of this result is 
that the influence of the Supreme Audit Office in Indonesia, though significant, should be more rigour 
because by 2015 86 municipalities were yet to adopt IPSAS accrual. (POLYS) Politics score (beta 
coefficient =.078, t value = 0.641, p value =0.491) suggests that councillors can influence the speed of 
IPSAS adoption by only 6.1%. It is, therefore, a positive but not significant driver of the velocity of 
IPSAS adoption. This explains that councillors are not interested with the accounting system of the 
municipalities as they would with other projects that contribute to the urban development. 
Evaluating the Impact of Mimetic Isomorphism  
  (SIZE) size remains a significant factor influencing the speed of adoption (beta coefficient = 
0.154, t value = 1.777, p value 0.043). Similar to the previous findings in Model 1 & 2 this finding 
confirms that the larger the size of a municipality the more quickly it will adopt IPSAS accrual 
accounting. 
 Evaluating the Impact of Normative Isomorphism  
 (EDU) is a moderately significant factor that drives the speed of IPSAS adoption in 
municipalities (beta coefficient = 0.195, t value = 2.183, p value = 0.076). As a normative pressure, 
this result suggests that the higher the number of university graduates among a municipality staff, the 
more quickly it will adopt IPSAS accrual accounting. Based on this empirical finding, the Model 
suggests that education level of staff in local government entities could influence the speed of adoption 
by only 19.5%. (AGE) is an inhibitor to the speed of IPSAS adoption among municipalities. It is 
reported to be negatively associated with adoption velocity (beta coefficient = -0.212, t value = - 2.097, 
p value = 0037). This suggests that if a municipality is older it is not inclined to adopt IPSAS adoption. 
This is the case among those having a life longer than 50 years. Overall, Model 3 also suggests that the 





Mimetic pressure; size and (3) Normative pressure: education and religion are all predictive of the 
adoption of IPAS accrual accounting among municipalities. Foreign grant has the most significant 
influence followed by audit opinions.  
The case of Cities 
Evaluating the Impact of Coercive Isomorphism 
(FGT) Foreign grant is significant at 5% level (beta coefficient = 0.313, t value = 3.961, p value 
0.009). This finding suggests that even among cities foreign grant influences the speed of adoption of 
IPSAS accrual accounting. The more the foreign grant, the more likely that a city will adopt IPSAS 
more quickly. In effect, foreign grant can influence the speed of adoption by nearly 30%. (LGT) Local 
grant: Similar to the case of municipalities, local grant has a negative but insignificant impact on the 
velocity of adoption (beta coefficient = -0.018, t value = -0.018, p value = 0.799). The result indicates 
that the more local grant that a city has taken the longer the time to adopt IPSAS. (AUDOP) Audit 
opinion is only moderately significant (beta coefficient = 0.206, t value = 2.281, p value = 0.019). 
Compared to municipalities, the reports of the Supreme Audit Office has less influence on the speed of 
adoption among cities. Cities may be paying less importance to the audit report or they may have other 
priorities over and above IPSAS adoption. (POLYS) Politics: The result indicates that councillors do 
not significantly influence the speed of adoption at city level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
councillors have other agendas than transparent reporting by using IPSAS accrual accounting. 
Evaluating the Impact of Mimetic Isomorphism  
  (SIZE) Model 6 reports that size is only a moderate driver of the speed of IPSAS adoption 
among cities (beta coefficient = 0.178, t value = 1.994, p value = 0.058). Compared to municipalities 
it is not necessary that the larger the size of a city the more likely it will adopt IPSAS accrual quickly. 
Evaluating the Impact of Normative Isomorphism  
Both education and age are moderately significant drivers of the velocity of adoption, (beta 





employ more qualified university graduates in the cities as well in order to be able to adopt IPSAS 
accrual. The more qualified personnel that a local government entity has the more quickly it can adopt 
IPSAS accrual accounting. (AGE) is positively highly significant at 5% level (beta coefficient = 0.317, 
t value 2.397, p value 0.021). Contrary to the case of municipalities, the result suggests that the older 
the cities the more quickly they will adopt IPSAS accrual. However, cities have not been for more than 
20 years as opposed to municipalities that have existed even for a century and more. 
Robustness Tests 
Alternative Measure for Speed of Adoption, Size & Politics 
There is apparently no evidence in the literature that we are aware of on the speed that a local 
government entity takes to adopt IPSAS despite so many studies on local government accounting. As a 
result, we cannot benchmark our finding with extant literature. We, therefore, use an alternative measure 
for speed of adoption in order to verify the strength of our result. We re-estimated Model 1 using speed 
of adoption in number of days (i.e. time taken in number of days to adopt IPSAS). The results are in 
Model 2 Table 6 and they are consistent with the main findings in Model 1. Similarly, we re-run the 
split regression for municipalities (Model 3) using speed in days in Model 4 and for cities in Model 6. 
The results remain in the same direction though age is not negatively associated with speed of adoption. 
Likewise, we use alternative measure of size namely: surface area i.e. square miles covered by a 
municipality or city and population size to assess the robustness of our results. We re-estimate Model 
1 using these alternative measures and the results (not reported for brevity) still support the main 
hypotheses that the three isomorphic pressures influence the speed of adoption of IPSAS accrual. Our 
proxy for POLYS was the size of the councils at each municipality and city. Given that the council 
comprises representatives of the government and opposition, we split the councils accordingly and re-
estimated Model 1. Although the results are consistent with the initial Model 1, the impact of audit 
opinion (AUDOP) has lost significance from 5% to 10% level. This could be eventuated from pressure 
of councillors on the auditors. In order to examine this possibility, we have statistically investigated the 





interactive effects between auditors and council members representing the opposition is more effective. 
Interaction with the opposition leads auditors to be more careful in their audit strategies, hence more 
sceptical and critical in their audit reports.  
Conclusion 
This paper has, for the first time determined the speed of local government entities in adopting 
IPSAS accrual. It began by classifying IPSAS adopter and then proceed to determine their velocity of 
adoption. Drawing from physics, we developed a metric to measure the speed of adoption and then 
crosscheck the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure for speed. On average, many 
municipalities and cities took a long time to adopt IPSAS accrual. The timing and frequency of the 
council meeting, government grants, representatives of opposition in the councils, pressure from the 
Supreme Audit Office and religious beliefs and practices are drivers of the speed of IPSAS accrual in 
Indonesian local government. In general, our results are robust and support the hypotheses that the three 
institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) influence the speed of IPSAS adoption. 
Different from extant studies on adoption, we have considered two specific factors in our study. First, 
the influence of the interaction of auditors and councillors and second the impact of religion on the 
decision to adopt IPSAS accrual. Although it was found initially that the Supreme Audit Office plays a 
key role in speeding up the adoption of IPSAS accrual, yet when the councillors interact with the 
auditors the impact changes. The interaction between auditors and the opposition has more significance 
on the speed of adoption than with the councillors representing the government. Arguably, it could be 
because these members have other political and economic agenda on the priority list against IPSAs 
accrual adoption. This study has some limitations. Firstly, many of the reports and documents are in 
Indonesian language and were translated into English by one of the authors whose native language is 
Indonesian. We have to rely on this translation. Secondly, we have relied on secondary data that we 
assumed reliable. Thirdly, the interactive effects of auditors and councillors could have been determined 
by conducting surveys and interviews, however, we have confined ourselves to only the secondary data 
available to us. This area can be further researched by conducting a full survey based (including 
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Table 1: Relationship Between Dependent and Independent variables 
Variables Description Types Isomorphism Expected Sign 
Dependent    
 
SAD (1) 
SAD (2)  
 
Velocity of Adoption (10 point scales) 
Velocity of Adoption (Number of days)  
  
Independent    
FGT Foreign Grant from international bodies Coercive +ve 
LGT Local Grant from Central government Coercive +ve 
POLYS Political belonging and ideology Coercive +ve 
AUDOP Supreme Audit Opinion Coercive +ve 
SIZE Measured by the following alternative variables; 
Log of Revenue 
Log of Total Assets 
Surface area in square miles under the responsibility of a 
municipality.  






EDU Staff with university degree Normative  
REL Religious faith and practices Normative ? 
Control Variables    
AGE Number of years a municipality/city exist Mimetic +ve 




















Table 2: Classification of IPSAS Adopters 
  Early Adopters On-time Adopters Late Adopters Non Adopters Total 
Provinces Municipality  City  Municipality City  Municipality  City  Municipality  City    
NAD/Aceh  0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
North Sumatera  0 0 0 0 15 3 11 4 33 
South Sumatera  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
West Sumatera  2 0 1 0 4 2 7 3 19 
Jambi  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Lampung  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Central Java  5 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 10 
West Java  1 1 1 0 8 1 14 1 27 
East Java  1 1 1 0 9 1 21 3 37 
Banten  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
DIY Yogyakarta  0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Bali  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Central Kalimantan  1 0 0 0 2 0 10 1 14 
East Kalimantan  2 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 10 
South Kalimantan  0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
West Kalimantan  0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 
North Sulawesi  0 0 0 0 2 0 9 4 15 
South East Sulawesi  0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 
South Sulawesi  0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
NTB  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Papua  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Riau  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Riau Islands  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Maluku  1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Bangka Belitung  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 15 3 3 0 68 13 86 17 205 
Prepared by authors using different sources. 
 
 
  Table 3: IPSAS Adopters: Speed of Adoption in number of days      
(SPAD1) (SPAD2) No. of Municipalities Cumulative No. of Cities Cumulative Grand Total 
< 0 < 0 15 15 3 3 14 
0—2 0-60 13 28 1 4 32 
2—4 60-120 5 33 1 5 38 
4—6 120-180 31 64 3 8 72 
6—8 180-240 15 79 6 14 93 
8—10 240-300 0 79 1 15 94 
>10 >300 4 83 0 15 98 







Table 4  Descriptive Statistics 
   
Variables  
Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
25 50 75 
SPAD (1) 3.41 0.00 2.23 -12.30 19.89 0.00 0.00 8.54 
SPAD(2) 120.15 152.00 100.15 -219.00 354.00 5.00 152.00 185.00 
LGT 2993.83 0.00 804.69 0.00 204000.00 0.00 0.00 957.09 
FGT 109260.93 66085.50 113649.76 0.00 470639.42 21599.94 66085.50 186055.33 
EDU 55921.92 10162.00 258185.10 0.00 2401548.00 4759.50 10162.00 20660.50 
AUDOP 1.82 2.00 0.64 1.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
SIZE 5.39 5.91 1.80 0.00 6.76 5.71 5.91 6.17 
REL 0.22 0.10 0.44 0.00 4.42 0.03 0.10 0.21 
POLYS 11.12 10.00 3.09 0.00 25.00 9.09 10.00 12.50 
AGE 174.51 65.00 253.76 2.00 332.00 13.75 65.00 198.25 
DEBT 3.14 3.63 1.52 0.00 5.50 2.31 3.83 4.20 
     EAD (1) Extent of adoption using ‘1’ for adopt and ‘0’ for not adopt, EAD (2) Extent of adoption using ‘1’ for early adopter,  
‘2’ on-time adopter, ‘3’ late adopter, ‘4’ non-adopter. LGT: Local Grant, FGT Foreign Grant, EDU: Graduate Workers working in 
municipalities/cities, AUDOP: Audit opinions in  the Report of the Supreme Audit Office, SIZE: Log of Total Revenue, REL: Religions 
measured as percentage of mosque per thousands of population, POLYS: Political influence at local government level measured as percentage 
of government representative on the council, AGE: Years of existence, DEBT: Log of total liabilities excluding total grant as a percentage of 
log of  total assets. 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlations 
  SPAD(1) SPAD(2) REL POLYS AGE SIZE LGT FGT EDU AUD 
OP 
DEBT 
SPAD(1) 1 1                   
SPAD(2) 1.000** 1                   
REL -0.197 -0.123 1                 
POLY 0.124 0.037 -0.109 1               
AGE -.206* -0.071 -0.002 -0.082 1             
SIZE -0.024 0.099 -0.023 -.172* .327** 1           
LGT -0.028 -0.029 -0.047 -0.034 -0.013 -
0.043 
1         
FGT -0.059 0.048 0.039 -0.096 .373** .639** -
0.024 
1       
EDU 0.023 0.128 -0.024 0.026 0.022 0.118 -
0.030 
0.091 1     
AUDOP .219* 0.016 -0.077 0.120 -0.113 0.114 -
0.069 
-0.032 0.138 1   




0.037 0.000 0.014 1 
205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
LGT: Local Grant, FGT Foreign Grant, EDU: Graduate Workers working in municipalities/cities, AUDOP: Audit opinions in 
 the Report of the Supreme Audit Office, SIZE: Log of Total Revenue, REL: Religions measured as percentage of mosque per thousands 
of population, POLYS: Political influence at local government level measured as percentage of government representative on the council, 






Table 6: Multiple Regression Analysis: Speed of Adoption  
 
Pooled Regression (Municipalities & Cities) 
Split Regression 
 
Municipalities only Cities Only 
 Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
   
    
 Speed Scale (SPAD 1) Speed in Days (SPAD 2) 
Speed Scale 
(SPAD 1) 




Speed in Days 
(SPAD2) 
 Panel A (n=205)  
Panel 171  Panel 34  
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
{t Value } {t Value } {t Value } {t Value } {t Value } {t Value } 
 
(p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value) 
Constant       
 
{5.97 {5.677} {5.792} {4.334} {4.792} {3.991} 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
LGT 
  
-0.021 -0.013 -0.0181 -0.009 
-0.014 -0.011 
 
{-0.13 {-0.11} {-0.19} {-0.11} {-0.18} {-0.081} 
 
0.897 0.878 0.875 0.799 0.799 0.891 
FGT 
  
0.318 0.243 0.313 0.224 
0.289 0.281 
 
{3.179 {2.982} {4.007} {2.688} {3.961} {2.457} 
 
0.002*** 0.0013*** .0013*** 0.048** .009*** 0.043** 
EDU 
  
0.195 0.139 0.184 0.14 
0.178 0.156 
 
{2.267 {2.392} {2.183} {2.004} {2.011} {2.101} 
 
0.068* 0.063* 0.076* 0.091* 0.083* 0.083* 
AUDOP 
  
0.199 0.164 0.206 0.178 
0.213 0.219 
 
{2.007 {2.018} {2.029} {1.978} {2.281} {1.894} 
 
0.049** 0.038** 0.026** 0.049** 0.019** 0.041** 
SIZE 
  
0.189 0.154 0.178 0.146 
0.171 0.149 
 
{2.027 {2.01} {2.014} {1.777} {1.994} {1.675} 
 
0.029** 0.043** 0.044** 0.043* 0.058** 0.081* 
REL 
  
-0.164 -0.142 -0.152 -0.139 
-0.222 -0.207 
 
{-2.124 {-2.002} {-1.876 {-1.342} {-1.573} {-1.342} 
 
0.041** 0.047** 0.043** 0.97* 0.035** 0.89* 
POLYS 
  
0.078 0.071 0.067 0.068 
0.055 0.025 
 
{0.708 {0.825} {0.641 {0.783} {0.606} {0.779} 
 
0.48 0.688 0.491 0.296 0.371 0.301 
AGE 
      
-0.223 -0.221 -0.212 0.097 0.317 0.0892 
 






0.045** 0.026** 0.037** 0.041** 0.021** 0.046** 
DEBT 0.126 0.11 0.142 0.148 0.131 0.153 
 
{1.567 {1.289} {1.763 {1.435} {1.521} {1.485} 
 
0.116 0.219 0.112 0.108 0.189 0.103 
AR Square 0.327 0.261 0.243 0.241 0.269 0.236 
DWT 2.246 1.91 2.098 2.321 2.192 2.271 
F Value 64.342 71.276 53.438 67187 61.234 59.187 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Panel: Pooled sample 205 entities; panel B: 171 Municipalities only. Panel C: 34 Cities only. 
 SPAD (1) = β0 + β1 FGT + β2 LGT + β3 REL+  β4 POLYS +β5  AUDOP+  β6 SIZE + β7 ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ε  

























Table 7: Regression using Alternative Measure of Size 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Size= SQKM Size= Pop Size= LTA 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  {t Value } {t Value } {t Value } 
  (p Value) p Value) (p Value) 
Constant       
  0.581 0.532 0.613 
  0 0 0 
LGT -0.12 -0.014 -0.011 
  -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 
  0.911 0.896 0.923 
FGT 0.287 0.279 0.284 
  3.072 2.988 3.041 
  0.002*** 0.0027*** 0.0021*** 
EDU 0.159 0.153 0.161 
  2.367 2.182 2.421 
  0.074* 0.068* 0.079* 
AUDOP 0.211 0.209 0.214 
  2.001 1.989 2.018 
  0.048** 0.048** 0.041** 
SIZE 0.143 0.139 0.151 
  1.969 1.901 2.023 
  0.046** 0.049** 0.036** 
REL -0.214 -0.209 -0.213 
  -2.011 -2.012 -2.089 
  0.048** 0.049** 0.044** 
POLYS 0.056 0.058 0.053 
  0.801 0.729 0.721 
  0.51 0.55 0.41 
AGE -0.215 -0.218 -0.214 
  -2.033 -2.067 -2.011 
  0.045** 0.039** 0.048** 
DEBT 0.118 0.119 0.113 
  1.569 1.783 1.391 
  0.149 0.139 0.161 
AR Square 0.234 0.211 0.216 





F Value 63.211 59.136 41.287 
P 0 0   0 
N 205 205 205 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 8significant at 10% level respectively; SQKM: Size is measured by the Square kilometeres 
covered by each municipality/city. POP: Size is measured by the population under the ambit of the municipalities/cities. TA: Size is 
measured using the log of total value of assets reported in the financial statements. 
 
Table 8: Regression using Alternative Measure of Politics 
  Model 10 Model 11 
  POLYS=PROGO POLYS=OPP 
  Coefficient Coefficient 
  {t Value } {t Value } 
  (p Value) (p Value) 
Constant     
  0.581 0.532 
  0 0 
LGT {-0.23 } {-0.019 } 
  0.893 0.899 
  0.281 0.263 
FGT 2.917 2.541 
  
.004*** 0.0029*** 
  0.142 0.156 
EDU 2.121 2.833 
  
0.074* 0.052* 
  0.211 0.209 
AUDOP 1.979 1.989 
  
0.058* 0.061** 
  0.143 0.139 
SIZE 1.969 1.987 
  0.046** 0.042** 
  -0.215 -0.211 
REL -2.014 -2.009 
  0.047** 0.049** 
  0.106 0.098 
POLYS 0.624 0.417 
  0.781 0.278 
  -0.213 -0.215 
AGE -2.019 -2.043 
  0.045** 0.039** 
  0.116 0.118 
DEBT 1.571 1.721 





AR Square 0.234 0.211 
DWT 2.321 1.978 
F Value 48.216 57.211 
P 0 0   
N 205 205 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 8significant at 10% level respectively. POLYS:PROGO = councillors representing government 
and OPP councillors representing opposition party.DWT = Durbin Watson Test 
 
Table 9: Regression using Interactive Effects 
Auditors & Politicians 
  




{t Value } {t Value } 
 
(p Value) (p Value) 
Constant   
 4.236 5.024 
 0 0 
AUDOP*PROGO 0.268 0.181 
 
{1.811 } {1.679 } 
 0.0101 0.121 
AUDOP*OPP 0.196 0.213 
 
{1.658} {2.081 } 
 0.049** 0.042** 
AR Square 0.381 0.295 
DWT 2.091 2.417 
F Value 38.167 22.752 
P 0 0 
N 171 34 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 8significant at 10% level respectively. 
SPAD(1) = β0 + β1 AUDOP*PROGO + β2 AUDOP*OPP  + ε       
AUDOP*PROGO= interaction between auditors and councillors representing government. AUDOP*OPP= interaction between auditors 
and councillors representing opposition party at councils 
 
 
 
 
 
 
